终极所有权、银行借款与投资行为的关系:基于商业银行制度变迁背景的经验研究

The Relationship of Ultimate Ownership,Bank Loan and Investment by Integrating Chinese Bank Institutions

本文讨论了我国商业银行制度变迁背景下银行借款与企业投资行为间的关系,并且分析了终极所有权对这种关系的影响。研究发现:银行借款与企业投资行为呈显著的负相关关系,不同期限银行借款对企业投资行为的影响不一致,杠杆治理作用主要由长期银行借款来体现。随着商业银行的制度变迁,银行借款的治理作用逐渐加强。在商业化阶段短期借款由于预算软约束的存在表现为对投资的促进,而长期借款则抑制过度投资,但治理效果不显著;在市场化阶段,短期和长期借款均与投资支出显著负相关;股份化改革之后,银行借款对投资的抑制作用增强。同时,银行借款财务杠杆的治理效应在非国企中发挥更好,而在国企中,随着政府层级的降低,终极所有权对上市公司中银行借款财务杠杆治理效应的影响依次减弱。

This study discusses the relationship between bank loans and corporate investment behavior by integrating Chinese bank institutions. A significant but controversial issue in finance is the impact that leverage has on a firm＇s investment decisions. Foreign scholars have proved that leverage is negatively related to investment both by theoretical studies and empirical studies. However, these studies use data from the western capital market which is more mature. Presently, the state-owned enterprise is major in Chinese capital market, and major bank loans carried on the listed firms＇ balance sheets as loans obtained from state-owned banks. In addition, as the biggest creditor in China, will and how the institutional reform of state-owned commercial banks affects the relations between leverage and investment？ But it is a pity that there are little researches on these problems in China. In this situation, under the specific policy background, taking the institutional changes of state-owned commercial banks as the main line, considering the status and characters of Chinese listed companies, this article analyzes and discusses the impact of bank loans on corporate investment behaviors and how growth and final ownership affect this relation. This thesis uses the statistic of unbalanced panel data of all listed companies except the financial sector in China during 1994-2007, in order to find out that how bank loans takes effect on investment. The empirical evidence provided in this paper indicates that, as a whole, bank loans are negatively related to investment, however, the term of the bank loans makes an important effect, the negative relation between long-term bank loans and investment is more stronger, inferring that long-term bank loans do the main governance effect. During the process of three stages of state-owned commercial bank reforming, the governance effect of the bank loans on investment become stronger. At the commercial stage, short-term bank loans promote investment for the soft budget constraint, long-term bank loans restrain overinvestment, but the effect is not good; after the joint stock reform stage, the governance effect of bank loans become stronger and stronger. This paper also finds out that the governance effect of the bank loans is stronger in the non-government company, and if the rank of the government ultimate controlling shareholder is lower, the effect to the governance effect of the bank loans from the government become weakening.