期刊文献+

收购方为什么要在兼并交易中雇用投资银行 被引量:1

Why Acquiring Firms Hire Investment Banks in Mergers and Acquisitions
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文考察了当兼并交易具有哪些特征时,收购方公司更可能会在兼并交易中雇用投资银行作为其兼并交易的财务顾问。研究结果表明,在下列情况下,收购方公司更有可能雇用投资银行作为其兼并交易的财务顾问:兼并交易较复杂,收购方公司的兼并交易经验不足,收购方公司仅收购目标公司部分资产或股权,兼并交易价格较高,兼并交易为敌意收购,收购方公司在金融行业运营,目标公司在很多行业经营。 This paper investigates what characteristics determine whether acquiring firms hire investment banks as transaction advisors in acquisitions.The research results show that under the following scenarios acquirers are more likely to hire investment banks: when acquisition transactions are complicated,when acquirers lack prior experience in acquisitions,when acquirers only acquire some assets or partial ownership of the target firms,when transaction prices are high,when the transaction is hostile,when acquirers operate in financial industry,and when target firms operate in multiple industries.
作者 同生辉
出处 《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期66-74,126,共9页 Modern Economic Science
关键词 兼并交易 交易成本 收购方公司 投资银行 财务顾问 Mergers & Acquisitions Transactional Cost Investment Bank Financial Advisor
  • 相关文献

参考文献11

  • 1Servaes H ,Zenner M. The role of investment banks in acqui- sitions [ J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1996,9:787 - 815.
  • 2Hunter W,Walker M. An empirical examination of invest- ment banking merger fee contracts [ J ]. Southern Economic Journal, 1990,56:1117 - 1130.
  • 3McLaughlin R,Does the form of compensation matter? [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1992,32:223 - 260.
  • 4McLaughlin R,Safieddine A,Vasudevan.K. Investment bank- er reputation and the performance of seasond equity issuers [J]. Financial Management,20(10,29:96 - 110.
  • 5Rau P. Investment bank market share,contingent fee pay- ments, and the performance of acquiring firms [ J ]. Jour- nal of Financial Economics,2000:56:293 - 324.
  • 6Kosnik R,Shapiro D. Agency conflicts between investment banks and corporate clients in merger and acquisition transactions: causes and remedies [ J ]. Academy of Man- agement Executive, 1997,11:7 - 22.
  • 7McLaughlin R. Adverse contract incentives and investment banker reputation: target firm tender offer fees [ J ]. Jour- nal of Financial Research, 1996,19 : 135 - 156.
  • 8Bowers H, Miller E. Choice of investment banker and share- holders' wealth of firms involved in acquisitions[J]. Financial Management, 19g0,19:34-44.
  • 9Jensen M, Meckling W. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3 : 305 - 60.
  • 10Travlos N. Corporate takeover bids,methods of payment, and bidding firm's stock returns[ J]. Journal of Finance, 1987,42:943 - 963.

同被引文献3

引证文献1

二级引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部