高管政治关系对国有企业绩效的影响——兼论国有企业去行政化改革

The Effect of Executive Political Relations to the Performance of State-owned Enterprises:and A Simultaneous Discussion on the De-administration Reform of State-owned Enterprises

本文实证研究了国有企业的外部区域环境和行业环境、内部创新环境,特别是内外部环境的纽带要素——国有企业的政治关系对国有企业绩效的影响。研究发现,国有企业高管的政治关系对国有企业利润提升产生了明显的促进作用;当高管所在企业与高管曾经的政治背景隶属于相同省份对企业绩效的促进作用相比不同省份更强,国有企业最终控制人的类型对国有企业的利润也有极为明显的影响。国有企业所在省份的产品市场发育程度在国有企业政治关系与国有企业利润之间产生了显著的调节作用。实证数据表明国有企业所处行业垄断程度对其利润产生了较显著的影响,但将国有企业政治关系纳入到模型后发现,垄断对国有企业利润影响不明显,同样的情形还表现在国有企业的R&D投入上。经过分析,本文认为,政治俘获理论在我国国有企业和地方政府博弈过程中有比较强的解释力,而国有企业高管去行政化改革将有利于改善政治关联对企业发展的影响。

In this paper, we conduct an empirical research on the effect of the political relations of State-owned enterprises to the performance of State-owned enterprises, on the aspects of State-owned enterprises＇ external area environment and industry environment, internal innovation environment, in particular the link elements between the internal and external environment. We analyze the leading source of profits for State-owned enterprises empirically on the executive political relationships level, by using the empirical data of State-owned enterprises in China. After controlling some State-owned enterprises internal characteristic factors including the enterprise scale, intangible as- sets, P/B （ price to book ratio） etc, we find that the executives political relations of State-owned enterprises which is considered as the link elements between internal and external environment of the State-owned enterprises play a significant role in promoting State-owned enterprises profits; the situation that executives political relations are in the same province with the State-owned enterprises they are working for has stronger promoting effect on the state- owned performance, comparing with the situation in the different provinces. The type of the ultimate controller of State-owned enterprises also has significant effects on the State-owned enterprises＇ profits. On the perspective of State-owned enterprises external area environment, the system environment of the area does not generate obvious in- fluence to State-owned enterprises＇ profits, we only find the level of produc.t market development has a significant regulatory effect on the State-owned enterprises＇ political relationship and the State-owned enterprises＇ profits; From the angle of the industry environment, we find that trade monopoly has a significant impact on the State-owned enterprises＇ profits, but when we take the political relations into the model, the monopoly effect to the performance of the State-owned enterprises is not obvious; There is also no significant promoting effect on the State-owned enter- prises＇ R＆D input which is considered as a internal environment factor of State-owned enterprises to the Stateowned enterprises＇ performance. After some analysis of the empirical research, this article finally argue that our country＇s state-owned enterpri- ses, though, plays an important role in the national innovation system, but we should deeply analyze that chief ex- ecutives of state-owned enterprises is a ＂profit-seeking occupation＂ or a ＂Rent-seeking＂ occupation？ From the em- pirical results, as well as the state-owned enterprise＇s technological innovation performance, state-owned enterprises executives may be a＂ Rent-seeking＂ occupation. And we may draw the conclusion from our empirical research that the political capture theory has strong explanatory power in the game playing process of China＇ s State-owned enter- prises and local government, and the de-administration reform to executives of State-owned enterprises will help to improve the political association effect on enterprise development.