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独立董事能够勤勉和诚信地进行监督吗——独立董事行为决策模型的构建 被引量:30

Can the Independent Directors Be Diligent and Trustworthy ——A Model Describing the Behavior of the Independent Directors During the Process of Monitoring
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摘要 本文关注的问题是独立董事在监督过程中,其勤勉性和公正性受到哪些因素的影响。通过建立个体行为决策模型,我们得出了以下结论:四项因素会对独立董事监督的效果产生影响。其中,来自独立董事个人方面的因素有两项:独立董事与控股股东之间的私人关系,会对监督的诚信度与勤勉度都产生负向影响;独立董事付出努力的机会成本,会对监督的勤勉度产生负向影响。来自外部环境的因素有两项:外部的监管力度能够同时促进独立董事监督的诚信度和勤勉度;控股股东对董事会的信息隐瞒会降低独立董事的勤勉度。基于以上结论,我们对独立董事制度的进一步完善与改进提出了相应的建议。 We model the independent director as a rational entity in the process of monitoring,in order to find the factors determining the diligence and trustworthiness of the independent director.We conclude that two personal factors as the evaluation of the personal relationship with the controlling shareholder and the opportunity cost during monitoring,and two external environmental factors as the concealment of information and external supervise will affect the diligence and trustworthiness of the independent director.Only those independent directors who do not take personal relationship much serious will be trustworthy during monitoring.And only those trustworthy independent directors whose opportunity cost is relatively low will be diligent during monitoring.The more information the controlling shareholder conceal from the independent director,the less diligent the director will be.The more external supervise is given,the more trustworthy and diligent the independent director will be.Our conclusion will contribute to the improvement of independent director system.
作者 宁向东 张颖
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期101-109,共9页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金研究项目"公司治理机制的实施程序与方式选择研究"(批准号70672002)
关键词 独立董事 勤勉 诚信 私人关系 声誉收益 independent director trustworthiness personal relationship return reputation return
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