柔性契约协调机制下的供应链采购优化与决策

Purchasing Optimization and Decision of Supply Chain based on Flexible Contract Coordinating

为提高供应链及链上各实体的收益,合理分配采购量,针对多个供应商和单一制造商组成的供应链系统构建了基于柔性契约协调机制的多对一供应链协调优化模型,分析了柔性契约协调机制对分散式供应链系统绩效的影响。针对多对一供应链结构中核心制造商有强议价能力的特点,建立了以制造商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型,分别讨论了集中控制和分散控制下的最优决策。在期权契约下核心制造商通过设计合理的契约参数,可以激励上游供应商的决策行为,从而使得分散供应链系统的绩效能够得到提高。仿真实验证明了该柔性契约协调机制的有效性。实验结果表明,在一定的契约参数条件下,制造商不能随意设置其初始采购量,否则可能导致协调失效。

To maximize the profits of the system and each entity on the supply chain, a coordination model was established based on flexible coordination mechanism of option contract. The influence on improving the performance of supply chain composed of multi-suppliers and a core-manufacturer was analyzed. Due to the characteristic that the manufacturer had strong bargaining power under the man- y-to-one supply chain structure, a Stackelberg game model was constructed in which manufacturer was leader and the suppliers were fol- lowers. Then, optimal decisions under central and decentralized control were analyzed respectively. It shows that manufacturer can de- sign appropriate parameters to encourage the suppliers＇ efforts while the performance of the supply chain making Pareto improvement. Finally, the validity of the flexible coordination mechanism was illustrated by a numerical example. The results also show that the manu- facturer cannot set the initial order arbitrarily under the very coordination mechanism.