摘要
当前,对企业囤积居奇行为的规制在我国遭遇了法律适应的问题,文章认为应依据《反垄断法》对企业囤积居奇行为进行规制。根据行动企业针对的目标市场不同可以将囤积居奇行为分成掠夺性囤积居奇和提高竞争对手成本性囤积居奇两种类型,对两者进行经济学分析可以得到两类囤积居奇行为对市场竞争及消费者福利所产生的影响存在一定差异。在对企业囤积居奇行为进行反垄断规制的实践中需遵循合理原则,依从四步骤对企业囤积居奇行为进行判定。
Nowadays, there is obstacle in the regulation of overbuying in China. Based on an economic analysis of overbuying, this paper proposes legal solutions. First, the corporate overbuying conduct may raise antitrust concerns under the Antitrust Law. Second, the economic analysis of overbuying distinguishes two different types of overbuying (predatory and rival cost-raising) according to their different target markets and potentially different economic impacts. Third, in practice of regulation, overbuying should be evaluated with a four-step rule of reason analysis under the basic consumer welfare standard.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第1期19-24,共6页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
河北省社会科学基金项目"零售商买方势力研究"(HB10EYJ003)
河北省科技厅研究与发展计划项目"河北省城乡一体化商贸流通体系建设问题研究"(11457202D-53)