双边道德风险与风险投资企业可转换债券设计被引量：25

Double-side moral hazard and convertible bond design in venture capital firms

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摘要个人有限理性和投资项目未来收益的不确定性使得风险投资家(VC)与风险企业家(EN)面临双边道德风险,论文将风险投资项目划分为创业初期和开拓产品市场阶段,并对不同阶段特征进行了刻画.通过引入VC与EN相对努力成本效率系数,讨论了在满足VC和EN效用函数及设定的约束条件下,控制权在VC和EN间相机转移情况下可转换债券是否以及如何能够对VC与EN所付出的努力水平产生的影响.并藉此求解了抑制双边道德风险的几种可能方法. Personal bounded rationality and the investment project of uncertainty of future benefits make ven- ture capitalists and entrepreneurs face the risk of double moral hazard. This paper divides the venture capital project into early days and the development product market stage. By introducing the VC and EN＇s cost coefficient, we discuss when the control transfer randomly between the VC and EN, whether and how convertible bonds will produce an effect on VC and EN operations in order to find some feasible solutions to the problems of double-side moral hazard.

作者吴斌徐小新何建敏

机构地区东南大学经济管理学院

出处《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期11-21,共11页 Journal of Management Sciences in China

基金教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(10YJA630165)

关键词风险投资双边道德风险可转换债券控制权 venture capital double-side moral hazard convertible bond control right

分类号 F830.59 [经济管理—金融学]

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