博弈视角下的大股东掏空与支持行为研究

The Research on Big Stockholders' Behavior of Tunneling and Propping by the Eyesight of the Game

大股东对上市公司采取掏空或支持投资行为的关键在于双方的博弈,若大股东的综合资本成本较低,那么大股东和上市公司之间存在重复博弈,这种情况下大股东采取支持行为,为了获得更长远利益;反之,则两者之间就是"囚徒"模型,大股东选择掏空追求短期利益。

Big stockholder＇s tunneling or propping activities in the course of investing mainly depend on games between the two sides,if big stockholder has lower total capital cost,there are repeated games.In this way,big stockholder take propping behavior into corporation in order to gain long-term profit.If the opposite is the case,it is a prisoner＇s model.In this way,big stockholder choose tunneling activities in order to gain short-term profit.