公司治理与中小企业融资方式

Corporate Governance and SME’s Financing Modes

与银行等债权融资方式相比，风险投资等股权资金提供者更偏好于直接参与公司治理，并且更多地集中在风险较高的高新技术产业。本文从债权和股权资金提供者收益结构的差异出发对这些现象提出理论分析：第一，债权资金提供者希望降低项目收益低于偿债水平的概率，故偏好以监督方式间接参与公司治理；第二，由于高于债务偿还水平的项目收益并不能为债权资金提供者获得，故其参与公司治理的强度低于股权资金提供者；第三，预期到资金提供者的最优公司治理方式和强度后，中小企业应该为风险较大的项目寻求股权融资，为风险较小的项目选择债权融资，以求企业期望价值的最大化。这个理论框架也有助于进一步理解如何加强对我国中小企业的公司治理。

Compared to debt finance, venture capitalists involve more in direct corporate governance. We propose a theory using payoff structure difference between debt and equity to explain the intensity of equity-holder or creditor＇s involvement in corporate governance. The theory predicts： （1） Creditors prefer to participate in corporate governance through monitoring to prevent bad events, in which cash flow falls below the endogenously determined debt repayment. （2） Creditor＇s intensity of corporate governance is lower due to his limited return on good events. （3） Given the optimal intensity of corporate governance, equity financing to riskier investments is consistent with firm value maximization. It helps to further understand how to strengthen the corporate governance of SMEs in China.