流域生态补偿中地方政府动态最优决策——微分对策的应用

Dynamic Optimal Decision Based on Watershed Eco-Compensation——Application of Differential Game Theory

运用微分对策理论,研究流域生态补偿机制如何影响政府在污染管理中所面对的跨时期动态最优决策。首先建立政府和企业的主从微分对策模型,描述两者的理性互动过程。然后运用极大值原理,求解考察期内的每一个时点上政府的最优税率和污染削减力度。用倒向微分方程从数理上分析了不同参数设置对决策变量的具体影响,找出改变决策变量路径形态的参数临界值,说明均衡解的现实含义以及影响参数取值的政策建议,最后给出改进的可能。

A simplified Stackelberg differential game model of a local government and a firm is created under some assumptions in the first step.We describe the process in which government and the firm make optimal decision during a given time horizon by Pontryagin＇s maximum principle.Then,we analyze that how the setup of different parameters influences the paths of control variables.Finally,the main economic implication of the equilibrium solutions is discussed.