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基于经济学实验的搭便车问题研究 被引量:6

Research on Free Rider Problem Based on Economic Experiments
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摘要 通过对搭便车行为的研究现状进行了梳理,采用行为与实验经济学的方法,对搭便车问题进行了分析,体现了跨学科交叉研究的特点。在现有实验基础上改进并设计了三项搭便车行为实验,分别研究了初始禀赋、收益率和信息公开等因素对搭便车行为的影响。实验数据显示,随着初始禀赋的增加,个体成员者更倾向于搭便车,女生比男生更倾向于搭便车;集体中至少存在完全搭便车型、不完全搭便车型和乐善好施型三类人群;当公共账户的收益率显著增加时,个体成员为追求利益会减少搭便车的行为;如果公开的信息存在利益导向作用,那么个体成员更倾向于搭便车。 Based on the collection and analysis of free rider behavior researches,this paper analyses free rider problem by using behavior and experiment economic method which reflects cross-interdisciplinary study features.This paper designs three experiments,which analyze how the initial factor endowment,the rate of return and the information disclosure on free ride influences free rider behavior respectively..The results are shown as follows: individual members are inclined to free ride while the initial factor endowment is increasing;females are more inclined to free ride;there are at least three categories in a group: complete free riders,incomplete free riders and benevolent ones;when the group account's rate of return increases significantly,individual members will restrain their performance of free ride so as to pursue benefit;individual members are inclined to free ride as long as the information disclosure mechanism is profit-oriented.
作者 周燕 张麒麟
出处 《哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2011年第5期27-31,共5页 Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词 搭便车 经济学实验 私人账户 公共账户 跨学科交叉研究 free rider economics experiment individual account group account coss-interdisciplinary study
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参考文献16

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