股权制衡的内部监督效应与公司绩效——基于沪深两市2007～2009年民营上市公司的实证检验

Share holding counterbalance's inner supervision effect and company performance——demonstrative inspection basing on Shanghai and Shenzhen 2007-2009 private listed companies

本文以2007～2009年沪深两市民营上市公司作为样本,研究了股权制衡的内部监督效应及其对公司绩效的影响。研究结果表明,制衡的股权结构有助于提升公司绩效;非制衡的股权结构不存在内部监督效应,无法对公司绩效进行提升;过度分散的股权结构通过董事会、管理层薪酬设置对公司绩效有一定的促进作用。

Based on the sample of private listed companies in shanghaiShenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2009,this paper analyzes the internal supervise effect of the check-and-balance ownership structure and its effect to the corporate governance.The result shows that the check-and-balance ownership can improve the company performance;the internal supervise effect does not exist in the no-balance ownership structure,which has no effect on the company performance;the ownership structure spread too thin has some improvement to the company performance by the compensation design to the board of directors and the management.