均值-方差结构下考虑缺货成本的收益共享契约机制研究

Study on Revenue Sharing Contract Mechanism in Supply Chain with Stockout Cost under Mean-variance Framework

缺货成本在供应链实际管理过程中发挥重要作用,然而在供应链模型分析中缺货成本却经常被忽略,基于此种情况,研究包含一个制造商和一个零售商的两级供应链收益共享契约机制,分析了缺货成本对风险规避的零售商最优订购量的影响,在收益共享系数提前确定的前提下,建立了集中决策下的均值-方差收益共享契约模型。结论表明:制造商作为零售商的协调者,可以通过选择最优批发价格,诱使零售商选择可以使整条供应链利润最大化的订购量,实现供应链协调,并且得出风险规避的零售商最优订购量不一定小于风险中性情况下的最优订购量。最后通过数值算例验证了这一结论并给出了结论成立满足的条件。

Although stockout cost plays an important part in the practice of supply chain management,it is often ignored in the analysis of supply chain models.The revenue sharing contract mechanism of a two-level supply chain including one manufacture and one retailer was researched.The impact of the stockout cost on the retailer＇s optimal ordering decisions was analysed.In the centralized setting with a pre-negotiated and determined profit sharing coefficient,the revenue sharing contract model under Mean-Variance framework was established The conclusion is that as a coordinator of the supply chain,the manufacturer could choose the optimal wholesale price and stimulat the retailer to choose the quantity which could maximize the profit of the whole supply chain and then realize channel coordination.In particular,with stockout cost,the risk-averse retailer does not necessarily order less than the risk-neutral retailer.Finally,with a special case that the demand followed the power distribution,the conclusion is verified and the exact conditions under which this would happen is derived.