国企经营者薪酬兑现与企业绩效的实证研究

A Positive Study of State-owned Enterprise Manager's Salary Cash and Enterprise Performances

企业经营者薪酬兑现制度是激励与约束机制的重要内容,其即时性可以实现对企业经营者的短期激励,滞后性有利于经营者的长期激励和约束。本文选取我国部分国有控股制造业上市公司的经营者为研究对象,以经营者行为作为中介变量研究薪酬兑现方式与企业绩效之间的关系,研究表明:当期兑现对经营者短期导向行为有显著影响,对企业运营绩效有正向影响;延期兑现对经营者长期导向行为有显著影响,对企业成长绩效有正向影响。研究结论对于选择适合的经营者薪酬兑现时机及兑现方式提供了理论依据。

The salary cash system enterprise of manager is an important item in the incentive and constraint mechanism. Its real instant can achieve the short-term effective incentive for the enterprise manager, and its delay can realize the long-term incentive and constraint for the enterprise manager. This paper selects many enterprise managers of part of state-owned enterprises and the state-owned holding manufacturing listed company in our country as the research objects. The manager＇ s behavior is as the intermediate variables for studying the function relationship between the salary cash means and the enterprise performances. The results show that the current pay encasement makes marked effect to the manager short-term guiding behaviors. It makes positive effect to the enterprise operating performance. The deferred pay cncasement makes marked effect to the manager long-term guiding behaviors. It makes positive effect to the enterprise growing performance. The results from the positive study can provide the theoretical basis for the company. It shows that how to select the suitable cash opportunities and salary cash means.