期刊文献+

存在易耗部件的耐用品垄断厂商策略研究 被引量:2

Strategies for Durable Goods with Easy-to-wear Accessories Monopolist
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摘要 本文依据一类特殊耐用品的使用特性,将该类耐用品分为耐用和易耗两个部分。研究了两阶段情况下存在易耗部件的耐用品垄断厂商的策略问题。结果表明:租赁纯策略是垄断厂商的最优选择;第一阶段的耐用品最优产量受到耐用品耐用度和第一阶段易耗部件耐用度的双重影响,但与第二阶段易耗部件耐用度无关;第二阶段耐用品的最优产量则受到耐用品耐用度、第一阶段易耗部件耐用度和第二阶段易耗部件耐用度的三重影响;第一阶段易耗部件的最优价格随耐用品耐用度的增加先递减后递增,而第二阶段易耗部件的最优价格与耐用品耐用度无关,各阶段易耗部件的最优价格只与同一阶段易耗部件的耐用度负相关。 Based on the use characteristic of one special kind of durable goods, we divided the durable goods into two parts-durable part and easy-to-wear accessories(EWAs). We explore a two-stage model concerning on the strategies for the durable goods with easy-to-wear accessories monopolist. The results show that the pure leasing strategy is the monop- olist' s optimal choice. The optimal output of durable goods of the first stage is affected by the durability of durable goods and the durability of EWAs of the first stage, but has no relationship with the durability of EWAs of the second stage. The optimal output of durable goods of the second stage is affected by the durability of durable goods, the durability of EWAs of the first stage and the second stage too. The optimal price of EWAs of the first phase, first decreased and then increased with the increment of the durability of durable goods, but the one of the second phase has no relationship with the durability of durable goods. The optimal price of EWAs in every stage only has negative correlation with the durability of EWAs in the same stage.
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期70-74,共5页 Forecasting
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2010XS38)
关键词 耐用品 易耗部件 垄断厂商 策略 durable goods EWAs monopolist strategies
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参考文献19

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共引文献42

同被引文献43

  • 1闫安,达庆利.耐用品动态古诺模型的建立及分析[J].系统工程学报,2006,21(2):158-162. 被引量:18
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