CoPS创新用户对系统集成商的激励研究——模型与模拟分析

Incentives for CoPS Innovation Users and System Integrators:Model and Simulation Analysis

本文通过模型的建立和模拟,对CoPS创新系统集成商的激励问题进行了探讨。认为在信息非对称条件下系统集成商的创新风险规避度和未来创新收益方差的大小将影响CoPS用户对系统集成商激励方案的设计,进而影响系统集成商最优努力水平的选择以及激励成本和总代理成本的大小,最后,影响各自收益的大小。

Complex Products and Systems（CoPS） are customized,costly,and technology-intensive products,systems,services,and infrastructure manufactured in single or small batches.During the CoPS innovation process,a system integrator＇s level of effort（LOE） directly affects the quality and progress of CoPS projects.However,system integrators will not be productive unless they are motivated by users with compensations.Therefore,CoPS users should leverage appropriate incentive contracts to improve system integrators＇ LOE in the innovation process,thereby increasing innovation profit for CoPS innovations. In this paper,we investigate methods to motivate system integrators of CoPS by proposing an incentive model.We discover that the level of innovative risk aversion and variances of future earnings will impact CoPS users＇ design of incentive programs because of asymmetric information,and will further influence system integrators＇ choices of optimal LOE as well as incentive and agent costs.Firstly,we construct our research model after studying assumptions and restrictions of variables in the model.We assume that supervisors are responsible and there is no conspiracy between supervisors and system integrators.Another assumption of this model is that a user＇s supervision level for system integrators remains constant.Therefore,the profit of CoPS innovations only depends on the system integrators＇ LOE.Secondly,we investigate optimal incentive contracts in two scenarios： observable and unobservable system integrators＇ efforts.We then analyze incentive costs and total agency costs for CoPS users.Consequently,we are able to derive Nash Equilibrium solutions when CoPS users are not able to observe the system integrators＇ LOE. Finally,the simulated,quantitative analysis of the model leads to the following findings.First,if CoPS users cannot observe their system integrators＇ LOE they should improve information systems,and establish regular communication with system integrators to exchange information and decrease the uncertainty in the innovation process.Only through these actions can system integrators＇ LOE be improved and the level of risk aversion,incentive costs,and agency costs can be reduced.Furthermore,CoPS users should give an appropriate compensation to integrators to share risks when system integrators＇ levels of risk aversion increase.In addition,when system integrators＇ levels of risk aversion are low CoPS users should let system integrators take all the risks and do not invest in fixed incentives to maximize profits.Fourth,when CoPS innovation users cannot observe their system integrators＇ LOE,they should choose a senior supervision engineer with qualifications and advanced skills to estimate profits due to innovation.Meanwhile,users should reduce the influence of external uncertainty as well.Finally,when the variance of expected revenues is small CoPS users should make integrators to bear all the risk and do not invest in fixed incentives to maximize their incremental profits.