共性技术VS专用性技术:基于三阶段非合作博弈的供应商研发决策

Generic Technology vs.Specific Technology:R&D Decisions of Suppliers Based on the Three-Stage Non-cooperative Game

本文针对面向多制造商的供应商研发决策问题,分别构造了供应商在选择共性技术和专用性技术研发决策情形下与两个制造商组成的三阶段非合作博弈模型,得到了供应商在这两种情形下各自的最优研发决策,通过对这两种最优决策情形下供应商最优研发程度比较,给出了这两种情形下供应商研发程度相等的条件和各自的占优区间。论文进一步讨论了供应商单位成本、制造商单位成本、最终产品替代率、单位研发成本变动对这两种情形下供应商最优研发决策的影响,并给出了相应的数值解,表明采用不同技术研发决策时供应商最优研发程度与制造商单位成本存在显著差异,即:采用共技术性研发决策时,与两个制造商单位成本负相关;采用专用性技术研发决策时,与面向专用性的制造商单位成本正相关,无专用性面向的制造商单位成本负相关。

Suppliers have been increasing their involvement of RD activities because a growing number of manufacturers are outsourcing their production and the technical capability of suppliers is improved.Suppliers are facing the dilemma of adopting generic or specific technology in their RD decisions.Suppliers adopting generic technology RD strategy participate in RD in order to improve quality of the final product or reduce component costs for all the manufacturers.Suppliers adopting the generic technology strategy participate in RD activities in order to improve the quality of final products or reduce component costs for all manufacturers.In contrast,suppliers adopting the specific technology participate in RD activities in order to improve the quality of final products or reduce component costs for a particular manufacturer.The decision contains two major problems： ① adopting generic technology or specific technology;② making an optimal RD decision in generic technology and specific technology. To better understand RD decision of supplier orientations on multiple manufacturers,this paper establishes a three stage non-cooperative game model composed with a supplier and two manufacturers.In this model,suppliers make RD decision on generic technology and specific technology,and receive the best RD decisions under each of the two situations.We can achieve the condition that RD degree of supplier is equal in two RD decisions and each dominant interval. This paper discusses the potential influence of optimal RD decisions of suppliers in two decision-making conditions.Furthermore,we try to optimize RD decisions by changing the unit supply and manufacturing cost,the substitution rate of final products,and the unit RD cost.Our analysis results show that significant differences exist between manufacturing cost per unit and optimal RD degree of suppliers for different RD decisions.Unit manufacturing cost is negatively correlated with the optimal RD degree of suppliers for RD decisions of adoption generic technology.In contrast,unit manufacturing cost is negatively correlated with the optimal degree of RD suppliers for RD decisions of adopting specific technology.However,the unit manufacturer-oriented cost is negatively correlated with the optimal degree of RD suppliers. Our findings show that supplier orientation has influence on multiple manufacturers in the process of determining optimal RD strategy.This study has two major limitations.First,we assume that the primary goal of RD suppliers is to reduce component costs in the model.Second,our proposed model does not consider the condition that suppliers participate in RD activities in order to improve the quality of final products.