摘要
小产权房治理中存在复杂的利益博弈关系,并由此导致了政策压力持续增加与小产权房快速扩张的悖论。考虑到动态治理成本,地方政府的实际偏好序列既不满足"理性经济人"假设,又难以符合政策预期,反而更倾向于通过合作的方式参与小产权房的利益分配。而对于利益相关者来说,遵守不会成为理性策略,他们只会在合作与冲突之间进行选择。小产权房治理中政策执行亏空的出现具有必然性,地方政府倾向于通过制度创新与制度仿效促进小产权房的合法化。
There exists a complicated benefit game due to the dilemma between the increasing policy pressures and the rapid expanding minor-property-right houses. Taking dynamic governance cost into consideration, the local government is not a ＂rational economic man＂ and its preference orders do not adapt to policy expectations. The local governments are inclined to share the benefits of minor-property-house through cooperation. As for the stakeholders, they will choose between cooperation and conflict, taking no account of obedience. Policy im- plementation deficit is inevitable and local government will promote legalization of minor-property-right houses by institution innovation and imitation.
出处
《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2011年第4期107-111,共5页
Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
辽宁省社会科学基金一般项目(L09BZZ006)
中国博士后科学基金项目(20110491525)
关键词
小产权房
偏好
博弈
合作
minor-property-right house
preference
game
cooperation
