摘要
资源合理利用与环境保护是维护当今经济平稳、健康、较快发展的重要前提。生态补偿是缓解经济快速发展与环境污染、生态环境破坏之间利益矛盾冲突的重要手段。它是为了制止生态破坏而征收或补偿的费用,所以不同于一般排污费和资源补偿费。本文根据补偿的类型不同,将生态补偿分为资源型生态补偿和环境型生态补偿。本文以流域生态补偿为例,将流域上游政府的策略简化为保护或不保护河流,下游政府针对上游的情况,选择"自主型"或"接受型",运用演化博弈的方法,分析流域生态补偿的特点和结果。结果表明:流域生态补偿需要中央政府的适度干预,而且关键点是保证上游地方政府收益始终最大化;中央政府干预的程度是使上游政府群的收益在保护的情况下比不保护的收益要大,而干预的结果则是使流域上下游的(保护,补偿)策略成为演化博弈的长期稳定均衡。最后本文针对我国现行流域管理体制,为我国流域生态补偿提供了政策建议,以推广我国生态补偿政策。
It is crucial to make rational use of resources and protect environment so as to maintain a stable, healthy and rapid development of economy. Ecological compensation is an important means to ease the contradiction between the rapid economic development, environmental pollution and ecological damage to the environment. It is a cost charged or compensated so as to prevent ecological damage, which is different from the sewage charges and resource compensation. On the basis of different types of compensation, it is divided into ecological resources and eco-environment compensation. Based on the example of river basin eco- compensation,this paper simplifies strategies of government in upstream watershed to whether to protect the river or not, while downstream government selects 'autonomous' or 'receptive' according the circumstances in the upperstream. Under such an assumption, river basin ecological compensation characteristics and results are analyzed by means of evolutionary game theory approach. The results show that: watershed eco-eompensation requires appropriate intervention of the central government, and the key point is to ensure maximal profits of the upper reaches of the local government ; the central government's intervention efforts are to gain more profits of the upper reaches of the government group in the case of protection than without the protection. The result is to make the intervention (protection, compensation) as a long-term stable equilibrium evolutionary game. Finally, aiming at China's current system of watershed management, suggestions are given for watershed ecological compensation in order to promote China's ecological compensation policy.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期8-14,共7页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70973013
70703001)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(编号:08JC630016)
2011年度辽宁经济社会发展重点课题(编号:2011lslktzdian-01)
大连理工大学人文社科科研专题(编号:DUT10RW412)
关键词
生态补偿
污染赔偿
流域
演化博弈
利益冲突
ecological compensation
pollution compensation
river basin
evolutionary game theory
interest conflict