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域间路径的一种安全宣告和撤销方法 被引量:2

Method for Securing the Announcements and Withdrawals of Inter-domain Routes
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摘要 目前得到广泛认可的域间路由安全机制(例如S-BGP)不能鉴别某条路由通告是正常的域间路径宣告,还是对于已撤销路径的恶意重放.这种情况会严重威胁域间路由安全.分析这种安全漏洞并提出相应的弥补方法.该方法为路由通告加上序列号,融合了带有消息恢复功能的自证明签名方案,能够在不增加计算量的情况下防止序列号被篡改.在发言人路由器接收验证路由通告以及撤销消息时,该方法通过这些序列号的缓存和对比判断机制,防范前面所述的重放攻击,为域间路径的安全宣告和撤销提供保障,同时在不需要密钥托管的情况下消除了繁重的证书存储和管理任务. Most of current existing schemes for securing inter-domain muting whose security is popularly accepted, eg. S-BGP, can not distinguish whether an update message is a regular update message for announcing route (s) or malicious replay for route (s) which have been withdrawn before. This security hole can pose serious threat to the Internet security about the inter-domain routing. In this paper, we analYSe this hole in detail, and present a method for remedying it. In this presented method, we introduce a se- quence number for every update message, and fuse a digital self-certified signature scheme with message recovery. This presented method can prevent the sequence number from being tampered without introducing extra burden of computation. When the speaker router of an autonomous system receives an update message for announcing or withdrawing route ( s), it can prevent this kind of re- play attack by its mechanisms about caching, comparing and judging these sequence numbers, so as to achieve a scheme for securing the announcements and withdrawals of inter-domain routes at the same time the heavy tasks of certificate storage and management are eliminated without introducing key escrow.
作者 杨波
出处 《小型微型计算机系统》 CSCD 北大核心 2012年第2期357-364,共8页 Journal of Chinese Computer Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(10961013 A010206)资助 江西省研究生创新基金项目(YC10A078)资助 江西省自然科学基金项目(2010GQS0048)资助 江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ11418)资助
关键词 域间路由 路径撤销 安全漏洞 重放攻击 序列号 inter-domain routing route withdrawals seeurtity hole replay attack sequence number
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参考文献20

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