基于声誉的独立董事行为研究

On Reputation and Behavior of Independent Directors

在我国特殊的公司治理环境下,独立董事的声誉是激励和约束其行为的重要机制。独立董事在其执业生涯中声誉与行为之间的逻辑关系为深入理解独立董事的行为机制打下基础。独立董事的声誉包含三个维度,由于信息不完全以及公众的辨别能力有限,这三个维度的声誉之间存在连带关系。独立董事的声誉既会给上市公司带来收益,也会给其造成成本,控制性股东在选聘独立董事时需要权衡这些收益与成本。独立董事在执业过程中,若由于上市公司的原因而使得其个人声誉受到损害,导致任职的期望收益低于机会成本,独立董事将选择主动辞职。独立董事在一期任职完成后(包括任期后主动辞职与下一期继续任职两种情况),会通过一定的方式对其声誉进行维系和修补。

Reputation mechanism is a crucial factor motivating and restricting the behavior of independent directors in China.The authors try to analyse the logic relationship between the reputation and behavior of independent directors,in order to establish the foundation for the comprehensive and deeply understanding of the behavior mechanism of independent directors.We conclude that the reputation of independent directors contains three dimentions,which would influence each other.The reputation of independent directors would bring the listed companies both gains and cost,which the controlling shareholder must consider on choosing independent directors.During the tenure of independent directors,when their reputation has losses by reason of the listed company,they will resign initiatively.In the last place,after the tenure,independent directors will maintain or remedy their reputation through certain ways.