互尊和自尊的伦理学——从罗尔斯的“相互冷淡”谈起

The Ethics of Self-respect and Mutual Respect:From the Mutual Disinterest of Rawls

文章围绕着相互冷淡与利己主义之关系问题,对罗尔斯在《正义论》中所作的"相互冷淡"假设的诸种可能的含义及其变化做了一个系统的梳理。文章力图表明,虽然"相互冷淡"假设确实留存有社会契约论的人性自利说的印痕,但罗尔斯对之的解释,尤其是他将相互冷淡与善的多元性之间等同,不仅在相当程度上拒绝了利己主义的指控,而且最终指示了一种他希望建构的自尊与互尊的伦理学。这一伦理学不仅使得正义与仁慈有可能在一个更高的层面上得以结合,而且构成了对康德目的王国的独特阐释。

Ever since the publication of Rawls magus opus Theory of Justice, his conception of mutual disinterest, which, according to Rawls, characterizes the artificial person in the original position, has always been a moot point. So, we attempted in this essay to clarify the meaning of Rawls＇ conception of mutual disinterest, which finally designates the plurality of the good, as part of the circumstance of justice. By this means, it is shown that Rawls＇ interpretation of mutual disinterest, which aims at a rejection of egoism charge, has not only distinguished it from the self-interested assumption central to the traditional contract theories, but also points toward an ethics of self-respect and mutual respect. Such an ethics would not only make possible a combination of benevolence and justice, but also provides us with a realistic rendition of Kant＇s realm of ends.