银行与企业交叉持股的理论与依据——基于国际比较的研究

The Theory and Evidence of Cross-shareholders between Banks and Firms:International Comparison

本文通过文献回顾分析了世界主要国家银行与企业交叉持股的经济后果。从银行持有企业股份的角度而言,一方面银行持有企业股份能降低委托代理成本,另一方面银行同时作为股东和债权人会产生利益冲突。从企业持有银行股份的角度看,企业持股银行最直接的后果是关联贷款。但是,关联贷款既可能是掏空银行的手段,也可能是因为银行对企业股东更为了解,所以发放关联贷款。本文的结论表明,银行与企业交叉持股既有积极的一面,也要严密防范金融风险。本文的结论对于促进产融结合具有积极的意义。

The paper analyses the economic consequences of cross-shareholdings based on literature review.From the perspective of bank＇s holding of firm shares,it may reduce agency cost,and banks act as shareholders and debt holders will cause interest conflicts.From the perspective of bank＇s holding of firm shares,related lending is a direct economic consequence.But there are also two opposite reasons for related lending.Firstly,related lending can be tools of tunneling.Secondly,the bank holders are familiar with firms,so firms can get related lending more easily.The findings in our paper show that cross-shareholdings between banks and firms have positive effects,but we also need to avoid financial risk.The paper has significant implications for development of cross-shareholdings between banks and firms.