中国学术数字信息资源市场中的买断博弈

Monopoly Game Model for Chinese Market of Academic Digital Information Resource

对中国学术数字信息资源市场中数据库服务商的垄断行为进行博弈分析,并对市场监管部门及不同规模服务商提出发展建议。通过模型分析发现:由于不同信息资源需求的不均匀性,买断少量高需求资源可以提升企业效益,不过垄断进行到一定程度就会停止,且先行动者获益更明显;规模小的服务商有更大动力买断数字信息资源,规模大的服务商的报复行动对规模小的服务商的效益影响不大,所以规模小的服务商具有很大的意愿买断信息资源;允许各服务商保有一定量独占资源,鼓励深度挖掘及提供个性化服务是形成市场良性竞争的有效途径。

This paper makes a game analysis on the monopoly action of academic digital resource database service provider, making development suggestion for service providers in different scale and market monitor department. It makes the conclusion that due to the inequality demand of information resources, buying out several resources in high demand can improve the company profit, but monopoly will stop at certain process, and the first mover will gain a distinct advantage. Small scale service providers are more likely to buy out digital information resource, because the revenge of big scale service providers has little effect on small scale firm. Promising different service providers monopolize certain resources, encouraging deep mining and providing personalize service are effective ways to lead to a benign competition.