市场规模、利润侵蚀和争取多产品跨国企业的政策竞争

Market Size,Cannibalization and Policy Competition for a Multiproduct Multinational Firm

本文考虑两个国家(或者地区)的政府为争取一家外国跨国企业直接投资(FDI)而进行的政策竞争。两国拥有不同的市场规模,跨国公司生产两种水平差别化产品。文章证明:均衡时跨国企业的FDI选择取决于市场规模效应(marketsize effect)、两种产品间的利润侵蚀效应(cannibalization effect)和两国FDI补贴政策的共同作用。在此基础上,本文进一步得到了政府间FDI竞争的福利含义。特别地,本文还证明了:两国福利可能因参与FDI竞争而获得帕累托严格改进,或者发生帕累托严格损失。

This paper studies policy competition for a foreign-owned multiproduct monopolist firm producing two products that are horizontally differentiated between two countries of different size. This paper shows that the equilibrium outcome of FDI competition is determined by the interaction between the market size effect and the cannibalization effect, and countries＇ subsidy policies. Welfare effects of competition for FDI are derived; in particular, This paper shows that the competing countries may Pareto strictly gain from or Pareto strictly lose from FDI competition.