论冯契广义认识论中的两条认识进路

On the two Approaches of Cognition in Feng Qi's General Epistemology

传统马克思主义哲学教材无外是沿着"感性经验—理论思维—具体真理"进路对认识论进行阐述。这一认识进路克服了先验论和经验论的缺陷,但也存在诸多弊端;特别是其淡化了主体自由人格的发展。而在冯契的广义认识论中,除传统认识进路以外,还突显出"认知—评价—理想"进路。它对前者的不足有所克服。比较这两条认识进路,可以进一步挖掘冯契对认识论的独特贡献。

The traditional materials of Marxist philosophy demonstrated the epistemology only along the approach of ＇perceptual experience-theoretic thinking-specific truth＇.This approach of cognition has overcome the defects of apriorism and empiricism,but still some shortcomings in it;it has neglected especially the development of the free personality.On the contrary,it is in Feng Qi＇s General Epistemology that an other approach is prominent besides the traditional one,named＇cognition-valuation-ideal＇,which resolves the troubles of the former to some extent.We can go further into the special contribution of the epistemology from Feng Qi by contrasting them.