博弈结构、生产方式与双方道德风险组织激励

Game Structure,Production Mode and Organization Incentive under Double-sided Moral Hazard

基于委托代理理论给出了双方道德风险组织激励问题的基本分析框架,建立合作与非合作博弈结构下双方道德风险组织激励问题的规划模型。以分析框架与规划模型为基础,引入线性生产与协作生产两种具体的生产方式,全面对比分析了不同博弈结构、不同生产方式下双方道德风险组织激励的均衡努力、最优契约和效用水平,揭示了不同博弈结构、不同生产方式下双方道德风险组织激励问题的特点与规律。

A basic analytic framework for incentive problem with double-sided moral hazard was proposed.And the programming models under different game structures were constructed.Based on the analytic framework and the programming models,through introducing linear productive function and collaborative production into them,equilibrium effort,optimal contract and utility level in incentive problems in organizations with double-sided moral hazard under different game structures and production modes were comparatively analyzed all-sided.It reveals the character and law of incentive problems with double-sided moral hazard under different game structures and production modes.