摘要
针对既具有在线报价销售又具有固定价格销售的相同商品条件下,销售商如何制定其最优价格的问题,提出了在线报价销售商与固定价格销售商定价的博弈模型,用于分析双销售渠道中在线报价销售商和固定价格销售商在追求各自利益最大化条件下,最优限制价格和最优固定价格的决定过程和博弈双方的定价策略。
With respect to the question that how to set optimal prices in the situation of name-your-own-price(NYOP) channel and posted price channel selling some products,the pricing game model between NYOP and posted price was established.The game model can be used for the NYOP retailer to set its optimal threshold prices and used for the posted price retailer to set optimal posted prices.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》
CAS
2012年第1期112-115,共4页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金
湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(2010y066)
关键词
在线报价
期望收益
博弈分析
最优策略
name-your-own-price
optimal threshold prices
game analysis
optimal policy