政企联盟与地方竞争的困局

Government-Enterprise Alliance and the Dilemma of Competition within Local Governments

企业安全生产滑坡、制假售假现象屡禁不止,表面上反映了部分企业家、政府官员的不道德、不作为,背后则是因为受到"政府与企业联盟"逻辑的支配。以"向地方分权与促地方竞争"为主要特征的制度安排为背景,本文发展了一个有关"政企联盟"的概念框架,分析了转型期的政企关系从"共容型联盟"转向"紧密型联盟"的内在逻辑。本文进一步证明,"紧密型联盟"的形成既是分权模式下的必然结果,也是中央政府管治努力被拆解、市场经济负面效应被最大程度释放的根源。随着经济规模的扩大和多元化利益格局的形成,曾经取得了巨大成就的分权模式开始陷入地方竞争的困局,进入到了一个高成本支付期。

Recently, mine disasters and manufacturing ＆ selling fake goods appear frequently on major newspapers. Safe production and product quality seem to be in a worse situation than ever before. Apparently, those problems may be caused by some entrepreneurs and government officials＇ immoral and nonfeasance. But, in fact, they are dominated by the logic of government-enterprise alliance （GEA in short） according to our analysis. In the background of institution arrangement which main characteristic is decentralization for local competition, a basic conceptual framework about GEA is developed. The intrinsic logic of the relationships between governments and enterprises turned from ＂encompassing interests alliance＂ to ＂tight interests alliance＂ is analyzed based on the model. And the formation of ＂tight interests alliance＂ is proved to be not only the inevitable result of the decentralization pattern, but also the source of central government＇ governance efforts being eroded and negative effects of market economy being in maximum release. Accompanied by the expansion of economy scale and the formation of interests＇ diversification, China-style decentralization pattern has made great achievements in the past 3 decades, however, it is in a dilemma of local competition now and a period of high-institutional-cost payment is on its way.