不完全信任模型下非线性的激励策略设计

Design of Non-linear Incentive Strategies in Semi-trusted Model

针对人力资源信息管理中"理性经济人"员工无法被管理者完全信任的问题,提出了一种新的非线性激励数学模型,实现了人力资源的激励策略优化。将该模型应用于不合格产品检测问题的案例,理论分析结果表明不诚实员工成功欺骗管理者的概率为1/n,其中n为激励检测样本集合元素的个数,从而证明了该激励模型的有效性。

For the purpose of solving trust problem of the employee as a rational economic man, a new non-linear incentive strategy model is presented for human resources information management. The given model is applied in the case of unqualified products detection, and the theoretical results prove that the probability of the dishonest employee cheating the manger successfully is 1/n, where n is the cardinality of the incentive set. Therefore, the incentive model is effective in the real applications.