公司治理机制理论研究文献综述

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摘要本文对公司治理机制理论研究的文献进行综述。公司治理机制是解决现代公司由于控制权和所有权分离所导致的代理问题的各种机制的总称,它既包括公司治理的法律和政治途径、产品和要素市场竞争、公司控制权市场、职业关注等外部控制系统,同时包括董事会、大股东治理、激励合约设计、债务融资等内部控制系统。

作者王金辉

机构地区新疆财经大学

出处《山东纺织经济》 2012年第2期73-75,共3页 Shandong Textile Economy

关键词公司治理机制内部控制系统外部控制系统

参考文献8

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山东纺织经济

2012年第2期

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