财政分权与地方政府社会保障支出--基于省级面板数据的分析

Fiscal Decentralization and Social Security Expenditures of Local Government:Based on Panel Data of Different Provinces in China

财政分权体现了中央政府和地方政府间的财政权力分配关系,财政分权效应假说认为,在我国现行的财政管理体制下,以不同标准衡量的财政分权度指标对地方政府的基本公共产品提供行为存在不同的影响。本文利用1998-2009年的省级面板数据,探讨了收入分权度和支出分权度对地方政府社会保障支出规模影响的差异。研究结果表明:收入分权度与地方政府社会保障支出规模成负相关,支出分权度与地方政府社会保障支出规模成正相关。此外,本研究还发现地方政府的社会保障支出存在库兹涅茨倒U曲线现象。

Fiscal decentralization reflects the financial power distribution between central government and local government. The hypothesis of fiscal decentralization effect considers that, in current financial management system, different standards of fiscal decentralization degree have different influences on the behaviors of local government in providing basic public goods. Using provincial panel data of China from 1998 to 2009, this paper analyses different influences of the decentralization degree of income and that of expense on social security expenditures of local government. Results shows that： income decentralization degree negatively correlated to social security expenditures of local government, while expense decentralization degree positively. In addition, the study also finds that social security spending of local government demonstrates the Kuznets Curve.