考虑战略顾客行为时的供应链性能分析与协调

Supply chain performance analysis and coordination with consideration of strategic customer behavior

动态定价策略的广泛应用使得越来越多的顾客具有了战略性,战略顾客会根据产品在销售期内的价格路径确定最优购买时机,零售商则根据顾客的购买行为确定订货数量和销售价格.研究了双方静态博弈时的理性预期均衡解和零售商进行数量承诺时的情形.研究表明:理性预期均衡时的最优销售价格、最优存货数量和最优期望利润分别小于标准报童模型的情形;数量承诺时的最优存货数量小于理性预期均衡时的最优存货数量;最优期望利润则大于理性预期均衡时的最优期望利润,并且在一定条件下可能会大于标准报童模型的最优期望利润,战略顾客行为的存在对零售商可能有利.最后分析了在分散式供应链中如何利用收入分享契约和数量折扣契约实现供应链协调.

The widespread application of dynamic pricing strategy has trained customers to be strategic. Strategic customers time their purchase optimally according to the price path of the product in the selling season, and the retailer determines optimal stocking quantity and selling price according to customers＇ purchase behavior. The rational expectation equilibrium solution when the two members play in a static game, as well as the situation in which the retailer makes quantity commitment to strategic customers, is investigated. It is found that the optimal selling price, optimal stocking quantity and optimal expected profit in rational expectation equilibrium are smaller than that in standard newsvendor model, respectively. The optimal stocking quan- tity in quantity commitment is smaller than that in rational expectation, the optimal expected profit in quantity commitment is larger than that in rational expectation equilibrium, and is larger than that in standard newsvendot model under some specific conditions, which indicates that the existence of strategic customer behavior may benefit the retailer. Further, revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract are utilized to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.