金字塔股权结构与终极股东利益侵占行为——来自中国上市公司控制权转移的证据

Pyramids Ownership Structure and Ultimate Shareholders' Embezzlement Behavior——Evidence from Events of Control Right Transfer of China's Listed Companies

金字塔股权结构广泛存在于我国上市公司之中,并以其复杂的结构降低公司透明度,隐藏终极股东身份,发挥放大控制权的杠杆效应,加剧股东之间的利益冲突。本文以2008年至2010年我国大宗股权转让事件为样本研究金字塔结构与终极股东之间的关系,结果表明金字塔形态特征和内部权力结构对终极股东利益侵占水平存在不同程度的影响。完善公司治理结构,加强上市公司信息披露制度和对大股东的监管势在必行。

Pyramids ownership structure widely exists in China's listed companies.Its complex structure reduces corporate transparency,con ceals the identity of ultimate shareholders,amplifies the leverage effects of control right,and intensifies the interest conflicts among shareholders.Based on the events of control right transfer of our listed companies from 2008 to 2010,this article studies the relationship between pyramids own ership structure and ultimate shareholders' embezzlement behavior.The result indicates that the form of pyramids structure and internal power structure have different effects on ultimate shareholders' embezzlement.Therefore,we should improve corporate governance,and strengthen the sys tem of information disclosure and the supervision of ultimate shareholders.