客户资源控制权与审计师轮换的治理效应

Client Resources Control and Quality Effects of Auditor Rotation

审计师轮换是构建注册会计师审计秩序化格局以防范会计欺诈的重要监管手段。我国资本市场以行政权力和关系网络为主导的治理模式影响了会计师事务所的产权结构安排和资源配置模式,出现了客户资源控制权个人化的现象,致使我国监管政策的微观运行基础与欧美国家存在重大差异,同时也阻碍了会计师事务所的内部治理,从而说明我国审计市场存在审计师轮换的客观需求基础。为此,将审计师的私人人力资本转化为会计师事务所的组织资本是提高审计师轮换质量效应的重要路径。

Auditor rotation is an important supervising method for constructing an order of CPA undertaking and avoiding accounting frauds. The capital market of China which is characterized with the administrative power and relationship affects the ownership structure arrangement and resources allocation models of accounting firms, as a result, the phenomenon of personalized client resources control arises. This practice is quite different from the western developed countries in terms of the microoperation of government supervision policy. This prevents the internal governance of accounting firms and calls for the auditor rotation in the audit market. Therefore, it is an important measure to transform the auditor＇s personal clients resources into the organization capital of accounting forms with the view to improving the quality effect of auditor rotation.