控制权收益与公司融资方式的选择

Corporate Control Benefits and Financing Choice

本文通过构建理论模型研究了控制权收益对公司融资方式选择的影响。研究结论表明:在存在控制权收益的情况下,公司对不同的融资方式存在偏好,当控制权收益大干取得此收益的成本时,公司偏好外部融资,且在股东的监督弱于债权人的监督下,公司偏好于股权融资。

This paper establishes a theoretical model to analyses the effect of private benefits of control rights on company financing. The study shows ： Private benefits of control rights influence corporate financing; when the control benefits greater than the cost which achieved this benefit, corporate prefer to external financing; When shareholder＇s supervision on company weaker than debtor＇s, corporate prefer to external equity financing