摘要
基于赢者通吃和信息不完全的假设,建立了削减量信息不完全下,双寡头厂商治污技术投资期权博弈模型,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明,厂商的博弈均衡存在且唯一,对称厂商的均衡结果为同时均衡;不对称厂商的均衡结果可能为序贯均衡、抢先均衡或同时均衡。
Under the assumptions of winner-takes-all and incomplete information, the option game model of pollution abatement technology investment for Symmetric duopoly with incomplete of pollution dis- charge reduction is constructed and numerically studied. The results show that there exists a unique equi- librium in the game. The equilibrium of symmetric duopoly is a collusive equilibrium, while the equilibri- um of asymmetric duopoly may be preemption, sequential or collusive equilibrium.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
2012年第1期83-86,共4页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873084)
关键词
治污技术投资
信息不完全
削减量
期权博弈
pollution abatement technology investment
incomplete information
pollution dischargereduction
option game
