证监会处罚对公司盈余管理的影响后果及机制研究

Influence Consequence and Mechanism of Penalty by CSRC to Earnings Management by Listed Companies

以2001—2009年因财务舞弊而被证监会处罚的上市公司为样本,检验公司受罚前后的盈余管理行为变化,结果发现:违规公司受罚后的盈余管理行为不仅没有减少,反而更多地使用了较为隐蔽的盈余管理方式——构建真实的活动以规避证监会的处罚;就处罚强度和处罚引起的市场反应这两种影响机制而言,市场反应的作用相对更大,市场反应的弱化会对公司的盈余管理行为起反向的激励作用。

Taking listed firms penalized by China Securities Regulatory Commission（CSRC） for financial frauds during 2001-2009,this paper investigates earnings management behaviors of listed companies before and after penalty notices.The finding is that companies don＇t cut down their earnings management behaviors after penalty notices.However,they use more covert ways to manipulate earnings-the real activities manipulation to evade penalties by CSRC.As to the direct and indirect influence mechanisms,the effect of the latter is relatively significant,but the weak market reaction has opposite encouragement on the earnings management of listed companies.