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低碳经济背景下中国企业碳交易博弈模型初探 被引量:8

低碳经济背景下中国企业碳交易博弈模型初探
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摘要 能源消费所产生的碳排放是经济发展过程中不可避免的副产品,目前我国已成为世界最大的温室气体排放国。碳交易是利用市场机制引领低碳经济发展的必由之路,对我国企业在碳交易进行博弈分析,具有十分重要的理论与现实意义。本文对我国大企业和中小企业分别进行了完全信息静态博弈分析、不完全信息静态博弈分析,并求出了企业双方达到纳什均衡后的碳交易量及交易价格。 Carbon emission produced by energy consumption is the inevitable by-products in the process of economic development.At present,our country has been the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases.Carbon trading is the inevitable way to using market mechanism to lead a low carbon economic growth,so the analysis on carbon trading game of our country's enterprises is of very important theoretical and realistic significance.This paper discussed the carbon trading game of our country's large enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises in complete information static situation and incomplete information static situation,and worked out the trading volumes and transaction price when it reaches Nash equilibrium.
作者 张立杰 苗苗
出处 《企业经济》 北大核心 2012年第2期57-61,共5页 Enterprise Economy
基金 陕西省软科学基金项目“陕西省高新技术企业TQM与创新关系研究”(批准号:2011KRM48) 陕西省教育厅人文社科基金专项基金“陕西省高新技术企业TQM与创新关系研究”(批准号:11JK0172)
关键词 大企业 中小企业 碳交易 博弈 large enterprises small and medium-sized enterprises carbon trading game
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