国有企业激励悖论——基于博弈论视角的解读

Incentive Paradox of State-owned Enterprise: Based on the Interpretation of Game Theory

国有企业在我国国民经济中处于重要地位,而其效率问题也是现代经济理论研究的热点课题,但是传统的提高国有企业效率的各种政策忽视了政策目标与政策结果之间的错位。针对这一问题建立了相关博弈模型,提出了国有企业的激励悖论,为长期提高国有企业效率提出了根本途径。

State-owned enterprise is very important in Chinese national economy, and its efficiency is the hot topic of modern economic theory. However the traditional policies to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprise ignores the dislocation between the policy objectives and the policy outcomes. This paper establishes a game model against this problem, proposes an incentive paradox of state-owned enterprise, and makes a fundamental approach for im- proving the efficiency of state-owned enterprise in the long term.