信息披露制度中的心理学诱导性陷阱及其应对

Psychological Trap in Information Disclosure System and the Way to Avoid It

设计一个良好法律制度的前提是需要了解所要规制的问题的根源所在。现行的信息披露制度中专家权威主导的披露方式会导致作为信息使用者的投资者对于专家的权威性产生依赖,因而产生思维定式,妨碍投资者进一步收集信息和考虑其它的可能性,导致投资决策的偏差。此外,对于信息披露的内容及性质缺乏揭示性说明以指出其条件性,也会导致投资者运用"小数定律"这一心理偏差进行决策,而机构投资者也存在心理偏差,因而他们无法对由噪音交易者心理偏差所产生的价格偏离基础价值的现象进行调整,会导致威胁金融体系稳定的市场泡沫,因此,监管机构也应当对他们的投资行为予以监管。

In current information disclosure regime, information is required to be disclosed in a standard form so as to enable investors to compare the products issued by different financial providers. The motivation of regulators is good and should have been appreciated by investors. However, things are not as good as expected. The author calls for regulator to seriously deliberate on the question of why autonomous investors seem to be manipulated by someone to believe in the correctness of the rating without any doubt on its credibility. Psychologically speaking, information disclosure indeed does some good to investors. However, it is also true that there are some flaws in it, especially when it comes to the way the information is presented. The information disclosure also has misleading effect that may lead to investors＇ misunderstanding about it. The institutional investors cannot be relied on to address the problem caused by retail investors who usually are deemed as irrational. They are strongly influenced by social factors so that they cannot redress the devia- tion of asset price. Actually Their behavior does not only undermine the efficiency of market prices, but also underscores the limitations of disclosure, as it shows that peer pressure and other survival concerns and not new information are the decisive factor in traders behavior.