上市公司真实盈余管理的动机--基于实证会计理论“三大假设”的视角

The Motivation of Real Earning Management in Listed Companies

真实盈余管理,是指企业管理者利用真实经济活动,扭曲企业的正常经营,达到操纵会计利润的行为。本文选取我国沪深市2002年至2004年制造业上市公司为样本,以实证会计理论"三大假设"为基础,研究了我国上市公司管理者进行真实盈余管理的动机。结论显示:债务契约、薪酬契约和政治成本,均与管理者实施真实盈余管理的动机显著相关。注册会计师审计质量也显著影响管理者实施真实盈余管理的动机,而且不同于国外研究结论,我国上市公司真实盈余管理和会计操纵型盈余管理呈现出显著的互补关系。

Real earnings management refers to the business managers using real economic activities,distorting the normal business operations,to manipulate the accounting profit.In this paper,we choose all companies in the manufacturing industry listed China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from the year 2002 to the year 2004 as research sample.Based on the 'three assumptions' of positive accounting theory,we have researched the motivation of real earning management in Chinese list companies in our special legal,market environment.Our conclusion:debt contracts,compensation contracts,and political costs,all were significantly related with the motivation of real earning management.Furthermore we found that the quality of the CPA also significantly affect the motivations of real earnings management.Different from the conclusions of the studies abroad,we found that in the Chinese listed companies,real earnings management and accrual earnings management show significant complementary relationship.