摘要
在研究黑格尔《精神现象学》的内容时,应该同时研究其体系学的形式。1807年的现象学是建立在诸逻辑基本环节的某种序列的基础上的,而这种序列与黑格尔当时的逻辑学构想是相一致的,并且在现象学内具有一种统一的功能。要弄清这些基本规定之进程,有着诸多困难。在现象学的布局中的修改并没有走到损害现象学之逻辑根基的地步。本文第一章表明,从一开始,黑格尔就提出了这一要求:在非实在的意识的方式与逻辑的环节之间要有一种严格的对应。第二章讨论这些逻辑的环节作为什么进入意识的经验当中,以及它们如何组织意识的经验。第三章具体说明这些逻辑的基本环节的序列及其同意识的诸阶段的对应。文章最后还把一种有关现象学的方法和有关耶拿逻辑学的发展的见解,提出来进行了讨论。
While studying Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit,it is necessary to study its structural form.The phenomenology in 1970 was established on an order of logical links which was in line with Hegel's concept of logic at that time and had a unifying function in phenomenology.It is very difficult to understand the process of such basic rules.The modification in the frame of phenomenology does not destroy the logical foundation of phenomenology.The first part of this paper analyzes Hegel's view that there should be a strict corresponding relationship between the way of consciousness and the logic links.The second part discusses in what form these logical links have entered the experience of consciousness and how they organize the experience of consciousness.The third part expounds the order of these logical links and their corresponding relationship with consciousness.The paper finally discusses a view on the phenomenological method and the development of Jena logic.
出处
《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第1期15-28,111,共14页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition