摘要
本文研究了风险投资的理论基础:经济增长理论、后凯恩斯主义企业理论、软预算约束理论、契约理论、诺斯制度变迁理论,分析了风险投资制度变迁中的"集团利益困境"及合约执行中的"人力资本产权残缺"、"委托代理风险"问题。认为"委托代理风险"的原因是所有者缺位,"人力资本产权残缺"是合约的动态调整滞后导致,"集团利益困境"是由于成员的搭便车行为及收益分享、成本分摊规则。最后,提出了规避风险的对策。
This paper introduces the theoretical foundation of venture capital investing：economic growth theory, Post-Keynesian firm theory,soft budget constraint theory,contraint theory,Norths institional change theory, discussing collective actions dilemma on Norths institional change theory,incomplete human capital property rights and princial-agent risks,concluding principal-agent risks from owners vacant position,incomplete human capital property rights from dynamic contract adjustment lagged, collective action dilemma from lift actions of members.Finally,the paper suggests avoiding risk strategies.
出处
《安阳工学院学报》
2012年第1期29-34,共6页
Journal of Anyang Institute of Technology
关键词
风险投资
信息不对称
委托代理
利益集团困境
契约理论
Venture capital
Information asymmetry
Principal-agent
Collective actions dilemma
contraint theory
