高管激励及其制度挤出

Incentive Contracts and Institutional Crowding out

基于经济人自利偏好的激励契约会对公司高管的内在激励产生挤出效应。激励契约的挤出效应根本上是源于委托人面对未来或然事件带给当事人效用的影响没有把握,由此释放出的不信任信号刺激了代理人对等的不信任,从而形成制度挤出。根据信任博弈模型分析发现,在经济组织中利益相关方主动构建在个人关系、制度上的相互信任关系,并形成信任、互惠公平的制度环境,是高管激励契约有效实施的基础。

The incentive contracts are an important kind of corporate governance for the agency problem.However,the designing of incentive contracts based on the self-interest preference crowds out the social preference of the agents.The incentive contracts based on the self-interest preferences was crowding out the social preferences of the agents.In essence,The crowding-out effect is originated from the uncertain impacts brought by the utility function of the various contingencies to the parties which lead to equivalent distrust by the agents to the principals and thus induce the trust crowding-out.Therefore,the foundation of the incentive contracts is the active trust within organization and the institutional environment of reciprocity and fairness.Finally,based on Trust Game,the trust relations arisen by the personal relations and institution could prevent the monetary incentives from crowding out altruistic preferences such as reciprocity and fairness,as well as inhibit the distortions of organizational efficiency.