劳斯对哈贝马斯科学观的批判

On Criticizing Habermas's Scientific View by Rouse

哈贝马斯以普遍的、非历史的劳动和技术旨趣建立起自然科学的认识论前提。自然科学诠释着人与自然之间的相互关系,而无关于人与人之间交往行为的表达,因此,自然科学避免了自身批判的可能性。劳斯认为,由劳动和技术设定的自然科学理解模式忽视了科学的实践解释学维度。科学实践的地方性、情境化以及社会历史性特征不仅体现了人与人之间的相互作用,而且以其强大的权力①决定科学自身并塑造生活世界,所以,科学实践应当承担批判和反思的任务。劳斯对科学实践的深度剖析为我们重新认识和评价当代日益科学化的世界提供了新的视角,但劳斯科学实践批判的局限性也进一步凸显出来。

Habermas emplaaslzes the moOel oI naturat science iOllOWS [ne rules ol numan labor ann tecnnology, since labor and communication are separated each other, the critique of science only belongs to inter-subjective communication rather than science itself. Rouse pointed out science which determined by the model of labor and technology not only trends to theoretical science, but also neglects the social and historical context of scientific practice. Scientific practice reflects the expression of inter-subjectivity whose political power determines its science and shapes our life-world, therefore, the critique of scientific practice must be accomplished by the critique of scientific practice which helps us recognize and evaluate science through a new perspective, and on the other hand, Rouse＇s critique of scientific practice shows its limitation.