摘要
本文以2001—2006年国有上市公司的经验数据为样本,对国有上市公司实际控制人按照行政级别分为中央政府和地方政府,以当前国有资产管理体制以及国有资产布局调整为制度背景,在分析国有企业成长性和投资机会的差异后,研究发现,在具有同样成长性的情况下,如果上市公司属于中央政府控制,其持有现金的价值大于地方政府所控制上市公司。
With data of Chinese non-financial listed companies through 2001-2006,this paper defines the ultimate controller of the state-owned enterprise as the central government and the local government according to government level.The research is based on the institutional background of the current state-owned enterprise administrative system and the deploy plan,and finds that the value of cash holdings is higher for listed companies controlled by the central government than those controlled by local government.This difference results from the fact that listed companies controlled by the central government grow faster and have more investment opportunities and higher investment return than those controlled by local governments.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期88-93,127,共6页
Modern Economic Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172064
70972039)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0452)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(08JA630036)
南京大学国际化会计学博士生项目
关键词
实际控制人
政府控制
现金持有价值
成长性
Ultimate controller
Government Control
Value of Cash Holdings
Corporate Growth Opportunity