政府控制、高管薪酬与盈余管理

Government Control、Executive Pay and Earnings Management

以我国上市公司为研究对象,考察不同政府控制下,高管薪酬激励制度对上市公司盈余管理的影响,实证结果表明,在国有企业中,高管薪酬与盈余管理正向相关,说明高管薪酬激励在一定程度上并不能积极参与上市公司治理,反而构成了盈余管理的动因之一;在民营企业中,高管薪酬与盈余管理正相关并不显著,说明民营企业中高管薪酬激励在一定程度发挥了治理功能并不构成盈余管理的动因。研究结果有助于揭示高管薪酬激励制度作为公司治理的外部机制所带来的经济后果。

In this paper, to investigation the association between executive pay and earnings management under the control of different government. The empirical results show that executive pay are positive associated with earnings management in the state - owned enterprises,but executive pay is not significantly related to earnings management in private enterprises. Result contributes to disclose the economic effects of the executive pay as outside mechanism of corporate govemanee.