摘要
基因伦理学中的实体论认为,在道德讨论中,人的自然体以及附着在自然体上的精神过程是一个神圣不可侵犯的实体,通过基因技术对人进行干预和操纵是极不道德的。然而从社会实践来看,自然基础不能作为反对基因技术干预的基础,对技术责任的担忧也不能成为否定人之自由的理由。
The theory of reality of gene ethics insists that the natural body and mental state of man is such an integrated re- ality with sacredness and inviolability that it is terribly immoral to intervene and manipulate it by the genetic technology. However, the nature is not the rational bases for ethical discuss opposing genetic intervention in terms of logical argument, and the responsibility to genetic technology is not the rational cause that limits the freedom of people to obtain more happi- er lives in terms of historical practice.
出处
《医学与哲学(A)》
北大核心
2012年第3期25-28,共4页
Medicine & Philosophy:Humanistic & Social Medicine Edition
基金
中国博士后科学基金"生命伦理学的当代视野"
项目编号:20090460231
关键词
基因伦理学
实体论
技术责任
自由
gene ethics, theory of reality, responsibility to genetic intervention, freedom