论我国公共财政救助问题银行的标准

On The Criterion of Restructuring Problem Banks by Using Public Finance in China

当问题银行陷入流动性或支付性危机时,为避免银行倒闭引发的多米诺骨牌效应,维护金融体系稳定,对问题银行实施公共财政救助已成为各国政府和金融监管机构的主要救助措施。我国相关法律制度不完善,公共财政救助的标准不明确,随意性较强,不仅大大加重了政府负担,也极易引发道德风险和通胀危机,因此亟需厘清公共财政救助问题银行的职能边界。救助标准应遵循系统性风险原则、最终救济手段原则、成本最小化原则、推定模糊原则。

When the problem banks fall into financial crisis or liquidity crisis,in order to avoiding domino effect and maintaining the stabilization of financial system,implementation of public finance bailout is becoming the important choice of many financial regulators around the world.China has spent trillions of public finance funds to rescue problem banks.However,due to the lack of relevant legislations in this field,there is lack of clear criterion of public finance bailout.This greatly not only increases the government burden,but also causes moral hazard and the risk of inflation happened easily.So it's necessary to define the boundary of public finance bailout to problem banks as soon as possible.